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Abstract
The decoupling hypothesis is the idea that business cycles in emerging mar-
ket economies have become more independent from business cycles in advanced
economies in recent years. Decoupling essentially amounts to a structural break in
the degree of business cycle interdependence between the two groups of economies,
and it can be tested as such. We develop an innovative measure of business cycle
interdependence based on the Euclidean distance, available at the annual frequency,
which allows for a proper test for a structural break in a graphical setup. We also
make use of a standard econometric test. Both approaches point to the same con-
clusion: there has been no decoupling in recent years. In fact, the degree of business
cycle interdependence has become stronger.
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1 Introduction
The decoupling hypothesis is the idea that business cycles in emerging market economies
have become more independent from business cycles in advanced economies during the
last decade. Proponents of the decoupling hypothesis argue that over the last decade,
emerging markets have achieved stronger growth in domestic demand, thereby lowering the
relative contribution of net exports to economic growth. Moreover, emerging markets have
allegedly also managed to strengthen domestic policy frameworks and to reduce external
vulnerabilities, thereby increasing the scope for counter-cyclical policies to mitigate the
impact of external shocks. Consequently, it is argued, these developments imply that
emerging markets have decoupled from advanced economies.
The decoupling hypothesis runs against the idea that globalisation, namely stronger
trade and financial linkages across countries, facilitates the international transmission
of country-specific shocks, thus leading to greater business cycle synchronisation. Since
emerging markets have become more integrated into the world economy, one would expect
greater business cycle interdependence with advanced economies. Indeed, the decoupling
hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with the extensive empirical evidence supporting the
idea that trade and financial integration lead to greater business cycle synchronisation.
Testing the decoupling hypothesis amounts to testing for the presence of a structural
break in the degree of business cycle interdependence between advanced and emerging
market economies. We follow two approaches. First, we provide graphical evidence on
the degree of business cycle interdependence between regional groups of emerging markets
and four aggregates of advanced economies. The bulk of the literature on business cycle
synchronisation makes use of correlation coefficients to measure interdependence. In the
context of the decoupling hypothesis, such a measure is problematic since decoupling is
expected to have occurred in recent years. Since correlation coefficients must be estimated
over relatively large sub-samples of the data, they do not display enough variation over
recent years. Therefore, pinning down a structural break with any decent degree of preci-
sion remains largely illusory. In contrast with the existing literature, we construct annual
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measures of interdependence by exploiting the fact that the Euclidean distance between
two standardized random variables provides the same qualitative information as the corre-
lation coefficient. This approach allows us to test for the presence of a structural break in a
meaningful manner. The Euclidean distance between business cycles of emerging markets
and advanced economies is calculated for each year in the sample and graphed against
time. Testing the decoupling hypothesis simply amounts to check visually whether the Eu-
clidean distance between standardized business cycles of emerging markets and advanced
economies has increased in recent years.
Our second approach follows Levy-Yeyati (2009) and is based on pooled regression
analysis. We regress pooled business cycles of emerging markets on the business cycle of
advanced economies, as well as an interaction term between the business cycle of advanced
economies and a dummy variable taking a value of one from a recent, arbitrarily chosen
year (between 1999 and 2007) until the last year in the sample. The coefficient estimate
on the interaction term provides information on a possible structural break in the degree
of interdependence. Should this coefficient estimate be negative and statistically different
from zero, the degree of business cycle interdependence between emerging markets and
advanced economies would have decreased significantly in recent years, thereby confirming
the decoupling hypothesis.
Our sample comprises thirty individual emerging market economies and four aggregate
groups of advanced economies, namely all advanced economies, the G7 group, the United
States alone, and Europe. The sample period runs from 1980 to 2008. Data on annual gross
domestic product at constant prices are retrieved from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
database. The business cycle is extracted using two different filters, the Hodrick-Prescott
filter and the Baxter-King filter. Both the graphical and econometric approaches point to
the same conclusion. If there has been any structural break in the degree of business cycle
interdependence between emerging markets and advanced economies over the last decade,
it is toward greater interdependence, not decoupling.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 focuses on the graphical
approach. The first part outlines our innovative empirical strategy to measure business
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cycle interdependence, including the data. The second part discusses whether there is
graphical evidence supporting the decoupling hypothesis. Section 3 describes the pooled
regression analysis and presents results from our estimations. Section 4 provides concluding
remarks.
2 A graphical test of the decoupling hypothesis
The decoupling hypothesis states that the degree of business cycle interdependence between
emerging markets and advanced economies has decreased in recent years. This definition
points out two requirements for a test of the hypothesis: a suitable measure of business cycle
interdependence, and a way to identify a structural break in the pattern of interdependence.
This section outlines a graphical approach to testing the decoupling hypothesis.
2.1 Empirical strategy
Business cycle synchronisation is usually measured as the correlation coefficient between
the business cycles of two countries, or groups of countries (see, for example, Baxter and
Kouparitsas, 2005; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Imbs, 2004,
2006; Kose et al., 2003; Rose and Engel, 2002). Flood and Rose (2009) have computed
correlation coefficients over five-year rolling sub-samples of quarterly data and find no
evidence of decoupling. But this procedure remains problematic to identify a structural
break in the degree of business cycle synchronisation.1 The last correlation coefficient
is calculated using the previous five years of data. If a structural break occurs within
this time period, the correlation coefficient may not pick it up. Ideally, we would like
to have a measure of business cycle interdependence which varies from year to year from
the beginning until the end of the sample. Such time variation would allow to identify a
structural break with much greater precision than by using correlation coefficients.
1Another problem is that the choice of sub-samples remains largely arbitrary and different sub-samples
of the same data can yield different conclusions. For example, Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999) have concluded
that participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of mutually fixed exchange rates raised business cycle
synchronisation, while Inklaar and de Haan (2001) reached the opposite conclusion using the same dataset
but splitting the sample in different sub-periods of time.
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Wa¨lti (2009) defines business cycle synchronicity as the coincidence of output gaps
(Mink et al., 2007) and finds no evidence of decoupling. When the business cycles of
two countries are in the same phase, that is when both output gaps are positive or when
both are negative, they are synchronous and the indicator is equal to 1. Otherwise, it is
equal to -1. The major advantage of this approach is that a measure of business cycle
interdependence can be computed for each year. As discussed in the previous paragraph,
this is a very desirable characteristic to test for the presence of a structural break in
recent years. The major drawback, however, is its binary nature. Consider two countries
A and B, both having positive but very distant output gaps. Their business cycles are
not very synchronised and yet, the binary measure is equal to 1. In contrast, suppose
that country A has a very small, positive output gap, while country B has a very small,
negative output gap. Their business cycles will be relatively close to each other and yet, the
binary measure is equal to -1. Unlike correlation coefficients, therefore, the binary measure
captures synchronicity, as defined by the coincidence of positive or negative output gaps,
but takes no account of differences in the amplitude of business cycles.
In this paper, we propose an innovative measure of business cycle interdependence
which conveys the same qualitative information as correlation coefficients, but which can
be calculated for each year to allow for a proper identification of a structural break. We
exploit the fact that the Euclidean distance between two standardized random variables
provides the same information as a correlation coefficient (see Appendix A for a simple
algebraic computation). The Euclidean distance between two business cycles can be com-
puted for each year in the sample and like correlation coefficients, it takes differences in
amplitude into account. In the one-dimensional case, the Euclidean distance is simply the
absolute value of the numerical difference between two business cycles. Thus, our measure
of business cycle interdependence between the business cycle of country i, denoted as gi,
and any of four groups of advanced economies a, denoted as ga, in year t is given by
φi,a(t) = |gi(t)− ga(t)| (1)
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When φi,a = 0, the business cycles of emerging market i and the group of advanced
economies a are perfectly in tune. Any positive value means less than perfect synchroni-
sation; the larger is the distance between business cycles, the less interdependent they are.
We will only present graphical evidence on the degree of business cycle interdependence
between groups of emerging markets on the one hand (all emerging markets, Asia, Latin
America, Eastern Europe), and four different aggregate groups of advanced economies,
namely all advanced economies, the G7 group, the United States alone, and Europe.2 The
measure of interdependence for each group of emerging markets is simply the unweighted
average of the Euclidean distance across group members. We have chosen the unweighted
average to prevent very large countries from dominating the group measure of interdepen-
dence.
There are many different ways to define the business cycle. For example, Kose et al.
(2008) focus on the rate of growth of real GDP as a measure of the business cycle. This
procedure is flawed when comparing emerging market economies and advanced economies.
Emerging markets are those countries which have experienced very high economic growth
over the last twenty years or so, while advanced economies have typically had lower growth
rates. Does this mean that they have decoupled in the sense that their rates of growth
have become more distant? Clearly, no. The trend growth rate of emerging markets has
increased significantly over the last twenty years but there is no indication that deviations
from trend have diverged between emerging markets and advanced economies (see Wa¨lti,
2009, for a discussion).3 The correct measure of the business cycle is to extract the trend
2Results for specific emerging market economies can be obtained from the author upon request.
3Kose et al. (2008) decompose the real GDP growth rate in over 100 countries into three factors: a
global factor, which picks up fluctuations that are common to all countries; an economy-type factor, which
captures fluctuations that are common to countries within each of the three types of economies advanced,
emerging, and developing; and a country-specific factor. These factors are estimated over two time periods,
1960-1984 and 1985-2005. During the second period, the share of the variation in growth rates explained
by the global factor decreased. At the same time, the share explained by the economy-type factor increased
for both advanced and emerging market economies. Kose et al. (2008) interpret this finding as decoupling
between advanced economies and emerging markets, but stronger convergence of growth rates within both
groups. But since trend growth rates diverged massively during the second time period, it must be the
case that the share of the variation in actual growth rates explained by the global factor has decreased,
and that the share explained by the economy-type factor has increased. This result obtains regardless of
the evolution of business cycle synchronisation.
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from a time-series of output and to compute the output gap of each country in the sample.
Data on gross domestic product at constant prices are retrieved from the October 2009
World Economic Outlook database provided by the IMF on its website. These data series
are available at the annual frequency from 1980 onwards, including forecasts for the years
2009 to 2014. We use both the Hodrick-Prescott filter4 and the Baxter-King filter to extract
the time-varying trend from the original data. The business cycle is defined as the output
gap, that is the difference between actual GDP and trend GDP, divided by trend GDP.
The standardized business cycle is obtained by subtracting the mean of the output gap
and dividing by its standard deviation. Accordingly, the standardized business cycle has
zero mean and unit variance.
The Hodrick-Prescott filter features an end-point bias problem, whereby the last obser-
vation of the series has a disproportionate impact on the identified trend at the end of the
series. One solution would be to drop the last observation but this is not desirable when
testing the decoupling hypothesis. Since decoupling is supposed to have occurred in recent
years, we really need all available observations at the end of the sample. Alternatively,
we extend the sample period to include three years of forecasts (2009-2011) to extract the
trend from the original data and then drop these years in the analysis of business cycle
interdependence. As such, we exploit all available information on actual real output data,
while avoiding the end-point bias problem. Similarly, to the extent that the Baxter-King
filter loses three years of data at the end of the sample, we also extract the trend using
this filter by extending the sample period by three years of forecasts. Figure A1 in the
Appendix depicts the business cycles identified using the two filters. Both series are very
correlated for all countries; only two countries have correlation coefficients below 0.95.
The sample period ranges from 1980 to 2008 when the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used,
and 1983 to 2008 when the Baxter-King filter is used. We consider a large sample of thirty
emerging market countries from different regions of the world: eight Asian economies
(China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam), nine
Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru,
4We make use of a penalty parameter of 4 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
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Uruguay and Venezuela), and thirteen Eastern European economies (Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Turkey and Ukraine). The four aggregate groups of advanced economies consist of either
twenty-six advanced economies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Ko-
rea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States), or the G7 group (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the United States), or the United States alone, or a European
group (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).5
2.2 Results
Figures 1 to 4 depict the average degree of business cycle interdependence over time for,
respectively, all emerging markets, eight Asian countries, nine Latin American countries
and six Eastern European countries.6 The upper part of each figure displays evidence
based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter, while the lower part presents results obtained with the
Baxter-King filter. Each graph shows the actual measure of business cycle interdependence
(blue line) as well as a time-varying trend (red line).7
INSERT FIGURES 1 TO 4 HERE
Testing the decoupling hypothesis amounts to check visually whether the average dis-
tance between the business cycles of emerging markets and the business cycle of advanced
economies has increased during the last decade. A visual inspection of the graphs in Fig-
ures 1 to 4 reveals that the average distance has not increased during the last decade.
If anything, the degree of business cycle interdependence between emerging markets and
5We have calculated the output gap of aggregate groups of advanced economies using PPP GDP shares
as weights.
6We only include the six Eastern European countries for which data are available throughout the whole
sample period.
7This time-varying trend is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the time period 1980-2011
to avoid the end-point bias problem.
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advanced economies seems to have become stronger in recent years, with the exception
of Europe which does not display significant change over the sample period. Thus, our
graphical approach provides no support for the decoupling hypothesis.
Doyle and Faust (2005) have emphasised the need for a proper statistical test to judge
whether the degree of business cycle interdependence has changed over time in a statistical
sense. In our context, however, such a test is not necessary. The null hypothesis (that
decoupling has taken place) is that the average distance between the business cycle of
emerging markets and advanced economies has increased. So long as it has decreased, no
statistical test is required to reject the null hypothesis.
3 Econometric evidence on the decoupling hypothesis
The standard approach to test for a change in the slope of the regression line within a
specific sub-sample of the data is to regress the dependent variable on an independent
variable as well as an interaction term. The interaction term is the product of the inde-
pendent variable and a dummy variable taking a value of unity for observations within the
specific sub-sample for which the slope coefficient is expected to have changed, and zero
otherwise.
3.1 Empirical strategy
We build on the approach of Levy-Yeyati (2009) and make use of pooled regression anal-
ysis to test for the decoupling hypothesis. The business cycles of emerging markets are
pooled and regressed on each of the four aggregate business cycles of advanced economies
separately, as well as an interaction term with a dummy variable taking a value of one for
observations within a sub-sample of the data corresponding to recent years. Since we do
not have any a priori information about the year in which the structural break could have
happened, we allow the starting year of the sub-sample of recent years to vary between
1999 and 2007.8 The econometric specification is given as
8Levy-Yeyati (2009) assumes that a structural break may have happened in 2001 but does not provide
a sensitivity analysis for this assumption.
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GAP-EMEi,t = α + βGAP-ADVt + γGAP-ADVt ∗Dt + εi,t (2)
where GAP-EMEi is the business cycle of emerging market i, GAP-ADV is one of
the four aggregate business cycles of advanced economies, and D is the dummy variable
introduced to test for a structural break. The statistical significance of the coefficient γ
provides a direct test of the decoupling hypothesis. A significantly lower degree of business
cycle interdependence obtains when the coefficient γ is negative and statistically significant.
This is easily seen by differentiating equation (2) with respect to GAP-ADV.
∂GAP-EMEi,t
∂GAP-ADVt
=
β when D = 0,β + γ when D = 1.
Our sample includes thirty individual emerging markets over the time period 1980 to
2008. Coefficient estimates are obtained by pooled ordinary least squares.
3.2 Results
Table 1 presents estimates of the coefficients β and γ for different years in which the struc-
tural break may have occurred, and for each of the aggregate business cycle of advanced
economies (advanced economies, the G7 group, the United States, and Europe). These
baseline results focus on business cycles identified with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Table
A1 in the Appendix provides the corresponding results when business cycles are identified
using the Baxter-King filter.
We find no evidence in support of the decoupling hypothesis. The coefficient on the
interaction term is positive and statistically significant in all regressions, irrespective in
which year the structural break is assumed to occur and irrespective of the specific aggre-
gate business cycle of advanced economies. If there has been any structural break, it is
towards greater business cycle interdependence between emerging markets and advanced
economies in recent years. Moreover, the coefficient on the standardized output gap of
advanced economies is generally also positive and statistically significant, with the excep-
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tion of Europe. The evidence is strongest for the United States. Overall, our results are
consistent with the empirical evidence showing that globalisation fosters business cycle
interdependence. The results in Table A1 show that our results are robust to using the
Baxter-King filter instead of the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the business cycle.
Tables A2 to A4 replicate the above analysis for three sub-samples of countries: Asia,
Latin America and Eastern Europe.9 Splitting the sample in such a way allows us to test
whether the pattern of business cycle interdependence differs geographical regions. It may
be the case that decoupling has occurred in one region only, and that pooling all individual
emerging markets together hides this region-specific structural break. The results in Tables
A2 to A4 are very clear. The rejection of the decoupling hypothesis extends to the three
sub-samples of countries; none of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe have decoupled.
Again, if anything, the degree of business cycle interdependence has increased in recent
years.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper casts light on the decoupling hypothesis. Testing this hypothesis amounts
to testing for a structural break in the degree of business cycle interdependence between
emerging markets and advanced economies in recent years. Our graphical approach relies
on an innovative measure of business cycle interdependence. This measure is based on the
fact that the Euclidean distance between two business cycles conveys the same qualitative
information as the correlation coefficient. However, a distance measure has the major
advantage that it can be computed on an annual basis, thereby allowing for a proper test
of a structural break. Our econometric approach follows the suggestion of Levy-Yeyati
(2009) to use pooled regression analysis.
Both the graphical and the econometric approaches point to the same conclusion. There
has been no decoupling between emerging markets and advanced economies in recent years.
If anything, the degree of business cycle interdependence has become stronger. Since our
9See section 2.2 for the list of individual countries.
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sample period ends in 2008, which marks the beginning of a major global crisis, it will be
interesting to examine the influence of this crisis on business cycle interdependence once
further data become available.
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Figure 1: Euclidean distance: all emerging markets and four advanced groups
(a) Hodrick-Prescott filter
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(b) Baxter-King bandpass filter
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Figure 2: Euclidean distance: Asia and four advanced groups
(a) Hodrick-Prescott filter
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Figure 3: Euclidean distance: Latin America and four advanced groups
(a) Hodrick-Prescott filter
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(b) Baxter-King bandpass filter
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Figure 4: Euclidean distance: Eastern Europe and four advanced groups
(a) Hodrick-Prescott filter
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(b) Baxter-King bandpass filter
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A The correlation coefficient and the Euclidean dis-
tance
The correlation coefficient and the Euclidean distance convey the same qualitative informa-
tion about interdependence for standardized random variables. The correlation coefficient
between two random variables x and y, denoted as ρ(x, y), is given as
ρ(x, y) =
cov(x, y)
σxσy
(3)
=
1
n
∑n
i=1 xiyi − E(x)E(y)
σxσy
Suppose that x and y are standardized variables, so that they have zero mean and unit
variance. Then, E(x) = E(y) = 0 and σx = σy = 1, and equation (3) reduces to
ρ(x, y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xiyi (4)
The Euclidean distance between two random variables x and y, written as d(x, y), is
given by
d(x, y) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 (5)
=
√√√√ n∑
i=1
x2i +
n∑
i=1
y2i − 2
n∑
i=1
xiyi
If x and y are standardized variables, then
∑
x2 =
∑
y2 = n. Thus,
d(x, y) =
√√√√2n− 2 n∑
i=1
xiyi
and using equation (4), we get
20
ρ(x, y) = 1− d
2(x, y)
2n
(6)
The correlation coefficient is equal to one when the Euclidean distance is zero. For any
strictly positive value of the Euclidean distance, the correlation coefficient will be strictly
smaller than unity.
In the one-dimensional case, the distance between two points on the real line is simply
the absolute value of their numerical difference. Therefore,
√
(x− y)2 = |x− y| (7)
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